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INCENTIVE STOCK OPTIONS AND
THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX:
THE WORST OF TIMES
FRANCINE J. LIPMAN*
Congress enacted the Alternative Minimum Tax ("AMT") to stop high-
income individuals from escaping their tax liabilities through tax code loop-
holes. In recent years, increasing numbers of moderate-income taxpayers
have been subject to astronomical AMT liabilities. The problem has been es-
pecially acute for technology sector employees who exercised stock options
while the market was high, sold their stock after its value fell, and found
themselves owing AMT they could not afford to pay. In this Essay, Professor
Lipman explains the Internal Revenue Code's complicated treatment of In-
centive Stock Options ("ISOs"). She argues that the AMT adjustment for
ISOs should not be eliminated, but suggests several reforms to simplify tax
treatment of ISOs and reduce the number of taxpayers who are subject to
AMT
I. INTRODUCTION
A. "The Best of Times"
The 1990s were the decade of employee stock options.' Employees
from the Silicon Valley to high-tech areas along the East Coast demanded
and negotiated compensation packages that included grants of stock op-
tions. As the stock market continued to soar into record territory through
* Assistant Professor of Accounting, The George L. Argyros School of Business and
Economics, Chapman University; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1981;
M.B.A., San Diego State University, 1989; J.D., University of California, Davis, 1993;
LL.M. (Taxation), New York University School of Law, 1994.
' The number of employees actually receiving stock options increased from less than
one million at the beginning of the 1990s to about ten million by the end of the decade.
Corey Rosen, Five Common Myths About Stock Options, Feb. 2002, at http://www.nceo.
org/library/optionmyths.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002); see also Liz Pulliam Weston,
Stock Options Add Tax Wrinkle for Many 'Dot-Coin' Employees, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 22,
2000, at C1 (citing National Center for Employee Ownership statistics demonstrating that
the number of American workers eligible to receive stock options increased from
2.5 million in 1992 to 14.0 million in 1999). More than ten million employees in America
own stock options today with an estimated value of between $500 billion and $1.2 trillion.
Jennifer Nelson, Opting In, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Bloomberg File; see also David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile
Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440, 442 (2000) (citing
John Helyar & Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Coffers Gush With Currency of an Opulent Age,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at B1).
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the spring of 2000,2 everyone wanted a piece of the growing stock-market
pie.3 Stories about overnight millionaires among the ranks of youthful
and enthusiastic "dot.comers" made headlines in newspapers, magazines,
and on the Internet.4 Employees and independent contractors, including
lawyers and accountants, increasingly sought equity interests in employ-
ers or clients in lieu of cash compensation.' More and more companies
adopted broad-based stock option plans and granted stock options to all
levels of employees.6 Employees desiring to minimize their tax costs pre-
ferred tax-favored incentive stock options ("ISOs").7 In response, numer-
ous corporations created ISO plans and granted their employees ISOs as
part of their compensation packages.'
2 See Tom Petruno, For Nasdaq, A Bittersweet Anniversary; Two Years After Reaching
Its Peak, The Market is Rallying, But Will Investors Ever See 5,000 Again?, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2002, at Bus.l (stating that the Dow index set a record high of 11,722 in January
2000 and the Nasdaq index set a record high of 5049 in March 2000).
1 See Personal Wealth: Money Isn't Everything in Salary Negotiations, BLOOMBERG
NEws, Feb. 7, 1996, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bloomberg File (quoting one
compensation executive that guaranteed bonuses, perks, and even base salaries "are out of
vogue" and that "incentives and stock options are in"); Matt Richtel, Need for Computer
Experts Is Making Recruiters Frantic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at Al (noting that re-
cruiters entice computer technicians and engineers with generous perquisites, including
stock options).
4 See Michael S. Malone, Nerds' Revenge: A How-To Manual, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1996, § 3, at I (noting that after initial public offering, Netscape employees had instant
personal fortunes); Eryn Brown, Fortune's 40 Under 40: Valley of the Dollars; The Young,
Wealthy Netheads of San Francisco and Silicon Valley Protest That It's Not About the
Money. Give Us A Break, FORTUNE, Sept. 27, 1999, at 100 (stating that "[m]ost people
who have a few million dollars have been compensated in options from one of the big su-
perstar companies"); Judith H. Dobrzynski, Chief Executive Puts Stock-Only Pay to Ulti-
mate Test, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1996, at Dl (describing chief executive of Ingram Micro,
Inc.'s stock option-only compensation package).
5 See Michael McDonald, California 'Model' Had Law Firms in New York Chasing
Fool's Gold; Equity Stakes, Expensive Staffs Don't Pan Out, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Mar. 26,
2001, at 13 (noting that "Brobeck's decision to take equity stakes as part of its fee seemed
like genius" and that Shearman & Sterling and Wilson Sonsini also took fees in clients'
stock in lieu of cash).
6 For example,
Research by Joseph Blasi at Rutgers University found that 97 of the top 100 e-
commerce companies offer options to most or all employees. A 1997 survey of
1,100 public companies conducted by ShareData, Inc., and the American Elec-
tronics Association found that 53% of respondents provide options to all employ-
ees. A 1999 William Mercer study showed that options are popular in all kinds of
public companies, with 17% of large public companies offering options to most or
all employees.
Employee Stock Options Fact Sheet, 2002, at http://www.nceo.orglibrary/optionfact.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
7 See DENNIS R. LASSILA & BOB G. KILPATRICK, U.S. MASTER COMPENSATION TAX
GUIDE 1502.02 (2d ed. 1999). ISOs provide favorable tax treatment compared to other
forms of compensation. See Thomas Z. Reicher et al., Statutory Stock Options, 381 Tax
Mgmt. (BNA), at A18 - A19 (2001); see also infra Part II.B.3.
8 See New Data Show Venture-Backed Companies Still Issue Options Broadly, 2002, at
http://www.nceo.org/library/optionventurebacked.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002) (not-
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B. "The Worst of Times"
Then the stock market bubble burst, and the unbridled exuberance
transformed itself into rising unemployment, dramatic capital losses for
investors, vacancies for property owners, and recession.9 For many em-
ployees, lay-offs and retirement-plan losses were only the beginning of
the worst of times. Just when they thought things could not get any
worse, the tax man poured salt into their wounds.
Employees who enthusiastically exercised ISOs during the 2000 tax
year, believing that their "phantom gains" were tax free, soon discovered
that they owed massive amounts of Alternative Minimum Tax ("AMT").' 0
The employees incurred AMT on their economic income from the exer-
cised options, measured as of the date of exercise, even though much of
this paper income had disappeared long before the end of the 2000 tax
year.l1 In many cases, the AMT consequences of ISO exercises took un-
suspecting employees by surprise and caught them without sufficient
cash to pay their AMT on April 15, 2001.12
As these unsuspecting employees work through their financial and
emotional challenges, many have joined together in a grassroots effort to
change the tax law.'3 This effort is exemplified by ReformAMT, a grass-
roots tax reform informational and advocacy group.' 4 The movement to
ing that 82% of 275 high-tech companies recently surveyed provide ISOs rather than non-
qualified stock options and that 62% provide only ISOs).
9 See Richard W. Stevenson, Economists Make It Official: U.S. Is in Recession, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2001, at Cl (stating that the National Bureau of Economic Research has
concluded that the U.S. economy entered a recession in March of 2001); Leslie Eaton and
Jayson Blair, Silicon Alley's Dimming Lights, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 2000, at BI; see also
The Tech Economy: Silicon Valley Party Literally Over; Once-Vibrant Dot-Coin Bash
Scene Among Casualties of Area's Burst Bubble, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, May 18, 2001, at
A4 (estimating that 327 internet companies folded between January 2000 and February
2001 and 8,000 high-tech workers in Silicon Valley lost their jobs from October to May
2001).
10 See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Riches to Rags: Workers Ambushed by Tax on Options,
BLOOMBERG NEws, Aug. 8, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Bloomberg File
(stating that internet and technology workers who received and lost millions of dollars of
stock value from year 2000 option exercises want Congress to relieve them from more than
$1 billion of AMT). Congress enacted the AMT in 1969 in response to concern that certain
high-income individuals were using deductions and exclusions available in the regular
income tax system to avoid paying any tax. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 9-10 (1969). The
AMT system operates in addition and parallel to the regular income tax system to ensure
that these taxpayers pay a minimum amount of tax. See I.R.C. § 55 (All I.R.C. references
in this Essay are to the 2001 version).
" See Matt Richtel, Stock Option Blues: Slide Leaves Little but a Big Tax Bill, N.Y.
TIEs, Feb. 18, 2001, § 1, at 1.
12 See id.; see also Donmoyer, supra note 10 (describing one taxpayer's $1.9 million
AMT debt and financial ruin).
13 See Liz Pulliam Weston et al., Tech Workers' Stock Options Turn into Tax Night-
mares, L.A. Thnms, Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.
14 For information about the organization's mission, see the ReformAMT Web site, at
http://www.reformamt.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2002). In March 2002, ReformAMT had
about 1590 members. See ReformAMT Geographic Membership, at http://www.kls2.com/
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reform the AMT has attracted support from many members of Con-
gress."5 Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Conn.) and House Ways and
Means Committee member Richard E. Neal (D-Mass.) have introduced
legislation to provide tax relief for individuals who exercised ISOs dur-
ing calendar year 2000.16 These bills have bipartisan support and an esti-
mated cost of $1.3 billion over ten years.' ReformAMT acknowledges
that its cause may not garner sympathy from those who believe that its
members are just "dot.com millionaires who do not want to pay their
taxes."'" However, ReformAMT has made admirable strides in focusing
attention on the AMT system. This attention is critical and timely. Recent
estimates indicate that the AMT will generate more than $600 billion of
tax revenue through 2011 and, more significantly, by 2010 will impact
approximately thirty-three percent of all taxpayers, most of whom are not
dot.corn millionaires. 19
C. The AMT and the Exercise of ISOs
This Essay argues that, while extensive reform of the AMT is neces-
sary, the exercise of ISOs should continue to result in a positive AMT
adjustment to regular taxable income, and thus remain subject to AMT
taxation. Congress enacted the AMT to ensure that high-economic in-
come individuals who reduce their regular tax liability through income
exclusions or deductions pay some amount of tax. The positive AMT
adjustment for ISO exercises ensures that employees who realize a
significant amount of otherwise excluded bargain purchase income pay
some tax. Elimination of this adjustment would be inconsistent with con-
gressional intent to limit ISO benefits and to tax individuals with high
economic income.
The exercise of an ISO results in an employee's realization of eco-
nomic income equal to the positive difference between the fair market
reformamt/geomembers.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
'5 For a list of AMT-related legislation, see Active Legislation, at http://www.
reformamt.org/legislation.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
16 See Lieberman Bill Would Provide AMT Relief for Incentive Stock Options, 92 TAX
NOTES 1196 (2001); Neal Bill Would Provide AMT Relief for Incentive Stock Options, 92
TAX NOTES 1194 (2001); see also Active Legislation, at http://www.reformamt.org/
legislation.php (last visited Mar. 26, 2002). On April 4, 2001, Representative Zoe Lofgren
(D-Cal.) sponsored a bill in the House of Representatives, H.R. 1487, which would repeal
the AMT adjustment for ISO exercises in 2000 and thereafter. See 147 CONG. REc. H1487
(daily ed. Apr. 4, 2001).
'7 See Lieberman Bill Would Provide AMT Relief for Incentive Stock Options, 92 TAX
NOTES 1196 (2001); Sponsorship of H.R. 2794 (noting that twenty-four Republicans and
twenty-four Democrats are sponsors), at http://www.kls2.com/cgi-bin/hrspon?bill=hr2794
(last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
" See About ReformAMT, at http://www.reformamt.org/about.php (last visited Mar.
20, 2002).
'9 See Heather Bennett, EGTRRA Will Subject 'Startling'Number of Taxpayers to AMT
By 2010, 93 TAX NOTES 1150, 1150-51 (2001).
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value of the stock at the date of exercise and the exercise price paid
("bargain purchase income"). In the case of the exercise, of a non-
qualified stock option ("NQSO"), ° or of most other employee purchases
of assets for less than market value ("bargain purchase"), this bargain
purchase income must be included in an employee's gross income and is
subject to income and payroll taxes as compensation.21
Qualifying exercises of an ISO receive favorable tax treatment. 2 The
bargain purchase income realized through. the exercise of an ISO is
specifically excluded from gross income? However, Congress has lim-
ited this favorable treatment by including ISO bargain purchase income
as a positive AMT adjustment to regular taxable income to determine
whether a taxpayer owes AMT.21 The AMT was enacted to impose tax
liability on high-income individuals who otherwise could avoid paying
taxes through artful manipulations of deductions and exclusions. Given
this congressional intent, it is appropriate to include otherwise exclud-
able economic income such as ISO bargain purchase income as a positive
AMT adjustment and subject it to AMT to limit the extent to which indi-
viduals can escape tax liability.
20 Options that do not qualify for tax-favored treatment under I.R.C. § 421 are NQSOs.
Any income an employee realizes from the exercise of NQSOs is subject to ordinary in-
come and payroll taxes under the general rules for transfers of property for services. See
I.R.C. § 83.
21 Any benefit an employee receives from her employer must be included in gross in-
come as compensation subject to ordinary income and payroll taxes, unless Congress has
specifically excluded it. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 83 (defining gross income for ordinary in-
come tax); id. § 3121(a) (defining wages for payroll tax). Thus when an employee realizes
bargain purchase income from her exercise of an NQSO or other bargain purchase, the
income is usually subject to taxation. In such purchases, the employee receives a benefit
from her employer, in that she can purchase stock or some other asset at a price below its
fair market value. This is analogous to a cash bonus to buy the asset. Like any cash pay-
ment, bonus, fringe benefit, or other accession to wealth, this benefit must be included in
gross income unless Congress specifically has excluded it. See id. §§ 61(a), 83.
22 Congress instituted tax-favored employee stock options, that is, ISOs, in 1981 under
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 251, 95 Stat. 172, 256-59
(amending I.R.C. §§ 421-25). An employee who receives ISOs from her employer does
not have to recognize any compensation on the grant or exercise of the ISOs. See I.R.C.
§ 421(a)(1). Moreover, when the employee sells her ISO stock, any appreciation is subject
to tax at favorable long-term capital gains tax rates. See id. § 1(h) (setting a maximum
long-term capital gains tax rate of 20%). Thus, tax-favorable treatment for ISOs effectively
converts compensation (currently subject to ordinary income tax rates of up to 38.6%) into
long-term capital gains (subject to tax rates up to 20%) and defers recognition of any
capital gain until the employee decides to sell the stock. See id. §§ 1(h)-(i), 1001, 1222;
Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623, § 3.01.
23 See I.R.C. §§ 421(a)(1), 422(a).
24 See id. § 56(b)(3). As a result, if an employee's alternative minimum taxable in-
come-including bargain purchase income-is large enough, she may have to pay AMT on
the bargain purchase income in the year of exercise. See id. § 55(b).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 9-10 (1969). A study of 1966 high-income tax returns
found 154 taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes greater than $200,000 who nonetheless
had no income tax liability. Twenty-one of the taxpayers in the study had incomes of over
$1 million. DANIEL J. LATHROPE, THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX: COMPLIANCE AND
PLANNING WITH ANALYSIS 1 1.01 (1994).
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While many ISO exercisers experienced significant adverse AMT
consequences in 2000, the problem is not that they are unique in having
to pay tax on assets that have declined significantly in value. The same
tax consequences result whenever any taxpayer acquires an asset with
after-tax dollars and the asset subsequently declines in value. The tax-
payer has realized and recognized income and must pay any applicable
taxes. If the taxpayer uses her after-tax dollars to make an equity invest-
ment that subsequently declines, she cannot then adjust the original
amount of income recognized to reflect the asset's later value. The tax-
payer will only recognize a tax loss and reduce her tax liability if she
sells her equity holding at a loss, and this tax loss would be significantly
limited under the current capital loss limitation rules. 26
In fact, taxpayers exercising ISOs benefit from an exceptional exclu-
sion from regular income tax on their realized economic income. 7 If this
realized economic income is significant, then the taxpayer might be sub-
ject to the AMT. However, the maximum marginal AMT rate is only
28%, versus the current highest marginal ordinary income tax rate of
38.6%.2' Therefore, even if ISO bargain purchase income is subject to
AMT, it is subject to taxation at a lower rate than the applicable tax rate
for ordinary income not excluded under the regular income tax system.
The real problem is the extreme complexity and lack of transparency
in the federal income tax system. Taxpayers who exercise ISOs often do
not understand that there are any income tax consequences, so they do
not act in an informed manner to plan the exercises optimally.29
Part II of this Essay begins with a brief explanation of the AMT
followed by a presentation of the current state of the tax consequences of
transactions involving ISOs and NQSOs. Understanding these conse-
quences is challenging because of the extreme complexity of the relevant
26 See I.R.C. § 1211 (b) (limiting tax losses from the sale or exchange of a capital asset
to the amount of capital gains plus up to $3,000 ($1,500 for married taxpayers filing sepa-
rately)).
27 Exclusion from gross income is the exception to the general rule of inclusion. See
id. § 61. Unless specifically excluded, benefits received by employees from their employ-
ers are included in gross income as compensation. See id. Employee benefits such as cer-
tain life insurance benefits, cash bonuses, certain meal and moving allowances, and bargain
purchases, including the exercise of an NQSO, must be included in gross income as com-
pensation. See id. §§ 61, 79, 82, 83, 132. However, the bargain purchase income an em-
ployee realizes from the exercise of an ISO is excluded specifically from gross income. See
id. § 421.
8 See id. § 55(b)(l)(A)(i) (AMT rates); Rev. Proc. 2001-59, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623,
§ 3.01 (setting forth 2002 individual regular income tax rates ranging from 10 to 38.6%).
29 See Weston, supra note 1, at Cl (describing widespread misunderstanding regarding
tax consequences of ISOs and communication of misinformation by companies to their
own employees); see also Amy Hamilton, Advocate Sends Simplification Proposals to
Congress, 94 TAX NOTES 7, 8 (2002) (National Taxpayer Advocate Olson comments that,
due to the AMT's complexity, a large number of taxpayers do not know that they have
AMT liabilities.).
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tax law. 30 After working through the intricacies of the general tax conse-
quences presented in Part II, the reader should appreciate the complexity
of congressional efforts and the confusion of affected taxpayers.
Part I explains the ever-growing problems in the AMT system.
This explanation includes an overview of ReformAMT, its members, and
its grassroots efforts to educate the public and Congress about the impact
of the AMT on ISO exercisers. It also describes legislative responses to
ReformAMT's concerns and lobbying efforts. Part III then details the
most commonly proposed modifications to the AMT, which do not in-
clude elimination of the positive AMT adjustment for the bargain pur-
chase income realized from an ISO exercise. They do include indexing
the AMT system for inflation and allowance of state and local tax and
personal and dependency exemptions as deductible items under the
AMT.31 These model reforms should decrease significantly the number of
taxpayers subject to the AMT, including some ISO exercisers. By simpli-
fying the AMT, taxpayers, including ISO exercisers, should be able to
understand better the application of and calculations for the AMT. Tax-
payers who understand how the simplified AMT operates should be able
to manage the exercise of their ISOs more efficiently to minimize their
overall tax costs, including any AMT.
Part IV describes why the elimination of the positive AMT adjust-
ment for the bargain purchase income resulting from an ISO exercise is
not a desirable AMT reform. While Congress provided tax-favored
treatment for ISOs,32 it also imposed certain limitations on these tax
benefits. 33 Along with qualifications on the favored treatment of stock
options under the regular income tax,' if ISO benefits and other income
received exceed certain thresholds, then the ISO bargain purchase income
is subject to AMT.35 Congress enacted the AMT to ensure that taxpayers
with significant economic income pay some tax.36 This Essay argues that
the positive AMT adjustment for the economic income realized by an
30 Daniel Shaviro, Tax Simplification and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 91 TAx NOTES
1455, 1457-58 (2001) (noting that taxpayers annually spend over 29 million hours com-
pleting and filing the AMT tax form and that more than ten percent of tax returns with
AMT-most of which were completed by paid preparers-had errors in the AMT calcula-
tion); Hamilton, supra note 29, at 8 (National Taxpayer Advocate states that the fifty-four-
line AMT form, with ten pages of instructions and a thirteen-line worksheet, is too compli-
cated for taxpayers to use without professional help).
31 Currently, taxpayers must add back deductions for state and local taxes and personal
and dependency exemptions to compute alternative minimum taxable income. See I.R.C.
§ 56(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(E). Under the proposed AMT reforms, they would not have to add
back such deductions and exemptions. The reforms would also increase exemption
amounts and index tax rates and exemptions for inflation. This would reduce potential
AMT liability and thus decrease the number of taxpayers paying AMT. See infra Part Im.C.32 See I.R.C. §§ 421(a), 422(a).
31 See id. § 422(b)(1)-(6), (d).
34 See id.
35 See id. §§ 56(b)(3), 55(b).
3See H.R. REP. No. 91-413, at 9-10 (1969).
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ISO exerciser is consistent with congressional intent to limit ISO benefits
and to ensure that high economic income individuals have tax liability.
Part V demonstrates that the AMT treatment of ISOs merely puts
them on par with other employee benefits, including NQSOs and other
employee bargain purchases.37
II. THE AMT AND EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS
A. What Is the AMT?
Congress instituted the AMT as a separate tax system that would
parallel the regular income tax system by creating tax liability for certain
individuals who otherwise would have none. The Code imposes the AMT
on every taxpayer subject to the regular tax. 8 The AMT system is basi-
cally a flat tax that applies the same tax rate to all classes of taxpayers,
whether married, single, or head of household.3 9 The manner in which
income is computed for AMT purposes often translates into a higher tax
liability.
Taxpayers compute their AMT using an expanded tax base called
alternative minimum taxable income ("AMTI"), 40 which is determined by
adding or subtracting certain listed adjustments and preferences to regu-
lar taxable income." These adjustments and preferences include, inter
alia, all state and local taxes, deductible miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions, certain interest on home equity loans, the standard deduction, all
personal and dependency exemptions, the bargain purchase income real-
ized in an ISO exercise, the exclusion for capital gains on the sale of
qualified small business stock, and certain accelerated depreciation de-
ductions.4" Taxpayers then subtract an exemption amount to determine
the "taxable excess."43 The exemption amount is phased out completely
when AMTI exceeds a certain threshold dollar amount.4 After deter-
mining "taxable excess," the taxpayer calculates "tentative minimum tax"
by applying a tax rate of 26% on the first $175,000 of taxable excess, and
a 28% tax rate on the balance. 5 If a taxpayer's tentative minimum tax is
17 See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROVISIONS RELATING TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS, JCX-107-00, at 2 (2000) (stating
that ISO transactions under the AMT are treated the same as NQSO transactions).
3 I.R.C. § 55(a).
3 Michael J. Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the Tran-
sition to a 'Flat-Rate'Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 550-554 (1983).
4 I.R.C. § 55(b)(2).
41 Id.
42 Id. §§ 56-57.
43 Id. § 55(d).
4 Id.
45 Id. § 55(b)(1).
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Congress has provided special tax-favored rules for ISOs.47 The
Code's ISO provisions allow an employee to convert ordinary income
realized from the performance of services, which currently is subject to a
maximum federal marginal income tax rate of 38.6%,4s into long-term
capital gain, which currently is subject to a maximum federal capital gain
tax rate of 20%. 49 Moreover, the employee recognizes capital gain at the
time that she sells her shares, not when she receives them through her
bargain purchase. Other transfers of property for the performance of
services are subject to tax at ordinary income tax rates at the time of the
transfer of property.50 Accordingly, ISOs provide employees with two
significant tax-favored treatments: (1) the bargain purchase income of the
ISO is subject to tax at preferential long-term capital gain tax rates; and
(2) recognition of income is deferred until the shareholder engages in a
sale or exchange of the ISO stock.
The Senate Finance Committee enacted the ISO provisions in 1981
with the intention of "provid[ing] an important incentive device for cor-
porations to attract new management and retain the service of executives,
who might otherwise leave, by providing an opportunity to acquire an
interest in the business.'' Congress believed that encouraging "manage-
ment of a business to have a proprietary interest in its successful opera-
tion [would] provide an important incentive to expand and improve the
profit position of the companies involved." '52
Many academics and business executives question whether stock
options accomplish this objective. 53 Economic studies regarding the ef-
- Id. § 55(a).
47 1d. § 421.481d. § 1(a)-(d); Rev. Proc. 2001-59, § 3, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623 (setting forth 2002 tax
rate tables for individual taxpayers under I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d), with ordinary income tax rates
ranging from 10% to 38.6%).49 I.R.C. § 1(h).
5 Id. § 83 (gross income includes the transfer of property for services to the extent of
the excess of the fair market value of the unrestricted property over the amount, if any,
paid for such property).
51 S. REP. No. 97-144, at 98 (1981).52 Id.
53 See James R. Repetti, Accounting and Taxation: The Misuse of Tax Incentives to
Align Management-Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZo L. Rv. 697, 701 (1997) (quoting
Warren Buffett's observation in 1985 that "[o]nce granted the option is blind to individual
performance. Because it is irrevocable and unconditional (so long as a manager stays in the
company), the sluggard receives rewards from his options precisely as does the star.').
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fectiveness of stock options in enhancing business profits are inconclu-
sive: "Although some studies conclude that the stock market reacts posi-
tively to the initial adoption of stock option plans, most studies are un-
certain about whether stock options or increased executive stock owner-
ship actually contribute to corporate profitability. '54
At least one commentator suggests that congressional skepticism
about ISOs' motivational effectiveness led Congress to enact- the AMT in
order to limit the tax-favored treatment of ISOs.55 That same commenta-
tor, however, criticizes this approach to tax policy and suggests that
"[r]ather than express ambivalence in the Code, Congress should elimi-
nate either the favorable regular income tax treatment of incentive stock
option provisions or the unfavorable alternative minimum tax treat-
ment."56 He concludes that Congress should eliminate the favored regular
tax treatment, which effectively would obviate the need for any AMT
consequences.57
2. Qualification for ISO Treatment Under the Code
To qualify for favorable tax treatment, the ISO and its holder must
satisfy several statutory requirements. 8 The ISO must have been granted
to an employee, pursuant to a plan adopted by stockholders, within ten
years from the date the plan is either adopted or approved by sharehold-
ers, whichever is earlier; the option must not be exercisable after the ex-
piration of ten years from the date of grant; the option cannot be transfer-
able except by will "or by the laws of descent or distribution" and must
be exercisable only by the grantee during his lifetime; and it must have
an exercise price equal to or greater than the stock's fair market value at
the time of grant. 9 The option holder must "not own stock possessing
more than 10% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
of the employer corporation or of its parent or subsidiary corporation."'
The holder of the ISO must hold the stock purchased under the option for
a minimum of two years from the receipt of the option and one year from
the exercise of the option. 61 Moreover, the holder must be an employee of
14 Id. (citing, among others, James A. Brickley et al., The Impact of Long-Range
Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & EcON. 115 (1985)
and Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empiri-
cal Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & EcoN. 11, 19, 29, 32 (1985) (finding no statistical relationship
between current year's stock option awards and performance)).
55 Id. at 702.
56 Id. at 703.
17 Id. (suggesting an elimination of the favorable regular income tax treatment and re-
vision of provisions in the Code "that contribute to management's tendency to behave
inefficiently.").
58 I.R.C. § 422.
59 Id. § 422(b)(l)-(5).
o Id. § 422(b)(6).
61 Id. § 422(a)(1).
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the issuer, or its parent or subsidiary corporation, at all times from the
grant of the ISO until three months before its exercise.62
In addition to these conditions, Congress also has limited the tax-
favored benefits of ISOs through a $100,000 per year limit. The aggre-
gate fair market value of stock with respect to which ISOs are first exer-
cisable during a calendar year is limited to $100,000 per year, measured
at the time of the grant.63
3. Tax Treatment of ISOs
a. Grant of an ISO
A transfer of property in connection with the performance of serv-
ices is an income recognition event for the recipient of the property.' 4 The
amount of recognizable income is equal to the fair market value of the
property less the amount, if any, paid-by the recipient for such property
(any bargain purchase income). 65 For instance, if an employer gives its
employee a new car, the fair market value of the car less the amount, if
any, paid by the employee for the car is included in the employee's gross
income and is subject to income and payroll taxes.
Under this tax provision, an employer's grant of an ISO to its em-
ployee is a transfer in connection with the performance of services that
normally would cause an income recognition event for the employee.
One of the tax benefits of ISOs, however, is that an employee does not
have to recognize any taxable income upon the grant, because the Code
and the related Treasury Regulations exclude an ISO grant from
classification as a "transfer of property."' The Treasury Regulations
specifically state that an ISO grant is not a transfer of the underlying
property.67 An employee must recognize income only if an employer
transfers property in connection with the provision of services. Because
an ISO grant is not a transfer of property, employees do not recognize
any income upon the grant of an ISO.
b. Exercise of an ISO: Regular Tax Consequences and AMT Tax
Consequences Compared
The primary tax benefit of an ISO is that an employee does not rec-
ognize income-either as ordinary income or capital gain-upon the ex-
62 1d. § 422(a)(2).
Id. § 422(d).
-Id. § 83(a)(1).
6 Id. § 83(a)(1)-(2).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(2) (as amended in 1985).
67 Id.
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ercise of the ISO. 68 However, when calculating taxable income for AMT
purposes, the bargain purchase income of the ISO must be included in
AMTJ for the year in which the option is exercised.6 9 AMT paid as a con-
sequence of an ISO exercise will result in an AMT credit for use in fu-
ture tax years. 0 The AMT credit is allowed as an offset against a tax-
payer's regular tax liability to the extent of the excess of the regular tax
liability over tentative minimum tax.7' Furthermore, this AMT credit can
be carried forward indefinitely.7
The tax treatment of the disposition of ISO stock also depends upon
whether the stock is disposed of within the statutorily required holding
period. The statutory ISO holding period begins on the date the employee
exercises her ISOs and ends on the date that is the later of: (1) two years
from the date of the ISO grant; or (2) one year from the date on which
the ISO stock was transferred to the employee upon ISO exercise.73
A qualifying disposition results if the employee disposes of the stock
after the end of the statutory period. An employee disposing of ISO stock
after the end of the statutory holding period will recognize a long-term
capital gain equal to the positive difference between the sale proceeds
and the employee's basis in the stock.74 For regular income tax purposes,
an employee's basis in her ISO stock is the exercise price; that is, the
dollar amount paid by the employee for the shares of stocky.7 For AMT
purposes, an employee's basis in her ISO stock is larger because it in-
cludes not just the amount paid by the employee for the shares, but also
the bargain purchase income included in the shareholder's AMT in-
61 I.R.C. §§ 421(a)(1), 422(a).
69 Id. § 56(b)(3). The "bargain purchase element" or the excess of the fair market value
of the ISO stock at exercise over the exercise price is treated as an "item of adjustment" for
AMT purposes. Originally, the "bargain purchase element" was a tax preference item.
However, the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 ("TAMRA") reclassified
the item as an item of adjustment, effective with respect to options exercised after 1987.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1007(b)(14)(A),
102 Stat. 3342, 3430. The AMT provisions, I.R.C. § 56(b)(3), provide that the nonrecog-
nition provisions found in I.R.C. § 421 do not apply to the exercise of an ISO for AMT
purposes. Therefore, the I.R.C. § 83(e)(1) exclusion from the application of I.R.C. § 83
does not apply. Accordingly, the bargain element is included in AMT income when the
holder exercises her ISOs. If the shares received from her exercise are subject to a sub-
stantial risk of forfeiture as defined in I.R.C. § 83 and the related Treasury Regulations, the
date for the calculation of the preference adjustment and for inclusion of the adjustment in
the calculation of AMTI is the date the restrictions lapse. The taxpayer may file an I.R.C.
§ 83(b) election within thirty days following the exercise of the ISO and, thereby, elect to
include the bargain element in income as of the date of exercise, and not when the sub-
stantial risk of forfeiture lapses, if at all.
70 I.R.C. § 53.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. § 422(a)(1).
74 Id. § 1001. If the employee's basis in her ISO shares is greater than the sale pro-
ceeds, she will realize and recognize a capital loss subject to any capital loss limitations.
Id. § 1211(b).75 1d. §§ 1011, 1012.
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 348 2002
2002] Incentive Stock Options and the Alternative Minimum Tax 349
come.76 The bargain purchase income consists of the positive difference
between: (1) the ISO exercise price; and (2) the fair market value of the
ISO stock at the time of option exercise.
77
If an employee disposes of ISO stock before the statutory holding
period expires, the disposition is considered a "disqualifying disposi-
tion," which is treated differently under the regular income tax system
and the AMT system if the ISO exercise and the disqualifying disposition
occur in different tax years.
78
To understand treatment under the regular income tax system, first
consider what happens when the stock price increases after the date of
exercise. In the case of a disqualifying disposition, the employee gener-
ally must recognize the bargain purchase income, measured as of the date
of exercise, as ordinary income,79 and any stock appreciation occurring
after the date of exercise is characterized as capital gain. 0 The capital
gain will be long-term or short-term, depending upon whether or not the
employee held her shares for more than one year after the ISO exercise.8'
The results change when the stock price decreases after the date of
exercise. When the price received by an employee who sells her stock in
a disqualifying disposition is less than the fair market value of the stock
on the exercise date, the amount of ordinary income she recognizes is the
excess, if any, of the amount realized on the sale over her tax basis in her
ISO stock.8 Any recognized loss is fully deductible against the bargain
purchase income realized on the date of exercise. 83 Therefore, the amount
76Id. § 56(b)(3). An employee's gain on the sale of her ISO stock will be a smaller
amount for AMT purposes, because the employee has already recognized as income the
bargain element in the exercise of the ISOs.
7Under the AMT, I.R.C. § 421 does not apply; therefore, the bargain purchase income
resulting from the ISO exercise must be included in AMTI. Id. §§ 56(b)(3), 83.
78 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.79 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.422A-l(b)(1), 49 Fed. Reg. 4507 (Feb. 7, 1984). Because the
option has failed to qualify as an ISO, the Code provides that the exercise of the option is
treated as any other transfer of property for services. I.R.C. § 83. Accordingly, the em-
ployee must include in gross income the excess of the fair market value of the shares of
stock (as of the date of exercise) over the amount paid for the stock, if any, in the taxable
year in which the disqualifying disposition occurred. Id. §§ 83, 421(b); see also Reicher et
al., supra note 7, at A9.
'
0 I.R.C. § 1001(c).
81 Id. §§ 1222-1223. For example, on December 28, 1998, Company grants Employee
100 ISOs to purchase shares of Company stock at $15 per share, the fair market value of
the stock on the date of grant. On April 15, 2000, Employee exercises all 100 ISOs, when
the stock price has increased to $20 per share. On December 31, 2000, Employee sells the
shares of stock for $26 per share. The sale of the stock was a disqualifying disposition
(that is, the employee did not hold the ISO shares for at least one year from the date of
exercise). Id. § 421(a)(1). Employee must recognize $500 of bargain purchase income as
ordinary income in 2000 ($20 fair market value on date of exercise less $15 amount paid =
$5 x 100 shares). Id. §§ 83, 421(b). Additionally, Employee must recognize a $600 short-
term capital gain in 2000 ($26 sales proceeds less $20 basis in shares sold within one year
= $6 x 100). Id. § 1001, 1222; see Reicher et al., supra note 7, at A9.
I.R.C. § 422(c)(2).
3Id. §§ 56(b)(3), 422(c)(2). For example, using the same facts as set forth in supra
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of the bargain purchase income recognized is limited to any gain realized
on the sale.84 However, if the loss is not otherwise recognized under the
Code, then the entire amount of the bargain purchase income as of the
date of the exercise must be included in gross income.85 The amount of
bargain purchase income recognized is added to the employee's basis in
her stock.86 Thus, the stock sale will result in a capital loss, which will be
disallowed under the applicable nonrecognition provision.87 Accordingly,
the employee must recognize all of her bargain purchase income meas-
ured as of the date of exercise as ordinary income and the subsequent
decrease in stock value is characterized as a capital loss. However, the
capital loss cannot offset any amount of recognized income, because the
Code has otherwise disallowed it (e.g., capital losses resulting from a
"wash sale" are disallowed).88
The AMT treatment will differ depending on whether or not the dis-
qualifying disposition occurs in the same year as the options are exer-
cised. When a shareholder sells her shares in a disqualifying disposition,
her income for regular tax purposes and AMT purposes is the same so
long as the sale occurs in the same tax year that she exercised her ISOs.89
As noted above, under the regular tax system the shareholder has to rec-
ognize the bargain purchase income as ordinary income.' If the shares
are sold for an amount less than the fair market value of the shares on the
date of exercise, however, then the amount of ordinary income recog-
nized is limited to any gain realized.9' Because the regular tax system and
the AMT system afford the same treatment, the shareholder will not have
note 81, assume that Employee sells the shares for $18 (an amount less than the $20 value
of the shares on the date of exercise). Employee only recognizes $300 of bargain purchase
income as ordinary income in 2000 ($18 sale price less amount paid $15 = $3 x 100
shares). See Reicher et al., supra note 7, at A10. However, if the loss is not otherwise rec-
ognizable (e.g., due to a "wash sale" under I.R.C. § 1091 or related party sale under I.R.C.
§ 267), then the realized loss cannot be offset against the bargain purchase income. I.R.C.
§ 422 (c)(2); see also Reicher et al., supra note 7, at A10-Al 1; infra note 98 and accom-
panying text (discussing hypothetical application of the "wash sale" rules to Jeffrey Chou).
In such case, Employee would have to recognize the bargain purchase income of $500 as
of the date of exercise ($20 fair market value at date of exercise less $15 amount paid = $5
x 100 shares). Employee would increase her tax basis in the shares sold by the recognized
bargain purchase income. I.R.C. § 1012. Thus, the employee also would realize a capital
loss of $200 in 2000 ($18 sales price less $20 tax basis = $2 x 100 shares), which the
taxpayer could not recognize under the wash sale rules. Id. § 1091(a). These tax conse-
quences are the same for any transfer of property for services, id. § 83, where the property
is later sold at a loss in a transaction in which the taxpayer cannot recognize the loss. See,
e.g., id. §§ 1091, 267, 165(c).
84 I.R.C. § 422(c)(2).
85 Id.
86 1d. § 1012.
87 See, e.g., id. §§ 1091, 267.
- Id. § 1091.
89 Id. §§ 56(b)(3), 422(c)(2); HR REP. No. 100-795, at 90 (1988); S. REP. No. 100-445,
at 96 (1988).
90 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
91 I.R.C. § 422(c)(2).
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any AMT adjustment for her exercise if both the exercise and the dis-
qualifying disposition take place in the same tax year.92
As a result, an employee may eliminate her AMT adjustment by
selling her shares before the end of the tax year when their fair market
value drops below what it was on the exercise date. However, if she re-
purchased the same company stock within thirty days before or after the
sale date, a "wash sale,"93 then the employee will have to recognize the
bargain purchase income as of the date of exercise as ordinary income
subject to less favorable ordinary income tax rates, and the loss realized
on the sale of stock will be disallowed.94
c. Real Life Experiences with AMT
To illustrate the complexity of the system, consider the following
real life scenario involving taxpayer Jeffrey Chou, leader of the grass-
roots organization ReformAMT, and his wife Cindy.95 In 2000, the Chous
exercised ISOs to buy approximately 100,000 shares of stock in Cisco
Systems, Inc. ("Cisco") at five to ten cents per share. At the time of the
exercise, Cisco was trading between sixty dollars and seventy dollars per
share. As a result of the ISO exercise, Jeffrey and Cindy Chou did not
have any recognition of regular taxable income, but they had a positive
AMT adjustment equal to the bargain purchase income from their exer-
cise. Because of the enormous discrepancy between the ISO exercise
price and the fair market value, the AMT adjustment totaled almost
$7 million. This significant positive AMT adjustment and the Chous'
other AMT adjustments translated into over $2.5 million of AMT and
state income tax. By the end of 2000, Cisco had dropped to thirty-seven
dollars per share, significantly reducing the value of the Chous' assets
and making it difficult for them to pay the AMT owed.
The Chous would not have found themselves in such a difficult
situation if they had understood the relevant tax provisions. If the Chous
9 See Weston et al., supra note 13 (suggesting that federal tax law offers an out for
those who used incentive options to buy stock that dropped significantly by the end of the
tax year, but only if the shares were sold before the end of the year).
93 See id. "Wash sale" rules disallow a loss sustained upon a sale or other disposition
of securities if, during the period beginning thirty days prior to the sale date and ending
thirty days after the sale date, the taxpayer acquires new securities substantially identical
to securities that had been sold. I.R.C. § 1091(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1091-1 (as amended in
1967).
94 Because the employee sold her ISO shares in a disqualifying disposition, the stock
does not qualify for ISO treatment. I.R.C. §§ 421(a), 422. Therefore, the regular income
tax system applies to the exercise, and the bargain purchase income as of the date of exer-
cise is subject to tax as ordinary income. Id. §§ 83, 1091. In this situation, the loss is not
recognizable and cannot offset the bargain purchase income realized as of the date of exer-
cise. Id. §§ 56(b)(3), 422(c)(2); see also Reicher et al., supra note 7, at A10.
95 See Weston et al., supra note 13 (describing Jeffrey and Cindy Chou's 2000 AMT
disaster); Donmoyer, supra note 10 (describing Jeffrey Chou's $1.9 million AMT debt and
financial ruin).
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had sold their Cisco shares for thirty-seven dollars before the end of
2000, they would have had a disqualifying disposition because the ISO
shares would not have been held for at least one year after exercise or
two years from the grant of the option. They no longer would have been
liable for AMT on $7 million in bargain purchase income. Rather, they
would have been required to recognize as ordinary income the lesser of
the bargain purchase income at the date of exercise ($7 million) or the
excess of the sales proceeds over their adjusted basis in the shares sold
($3.7 million). By choosing the latter option, they could have greatly re-
duced their tax liability. If they had understood that selling their shares
before the end of 2000 would have saved so much money, they could
have avoided the AMT and reduced their federal income tax bill by at
least $500,000.96
If, however, the Chous had reacquired their Cisco shares within 30
days of the disqualifying disposition (30 days before or 30 days after),
they would not be able to reduce their gross income.97 Rather, the entire
amount of the bargain purchase income ($7 million) would be included in
gross income and subject to tax as ordinary income. The resulting regular
income tax would be approximately $2.8 million ($7 million x 39.6%).
While the Chous' actual 2000 tax liability under the AMT was significant
($2 million), it was less than what the tax consequences would have been
had they sold their Cisco shares in a disqualifying disposition and reac-
quired them in a "wash sale" ($2.8 million).98
In summary, the Chous' tax liability would have varied greatly de-
pending on whether and when they sold their shares, as well as whether
they sold them in a wash sale. Because the Chous exercised their options
during the exuberant markets of 2000, they had to pay $2 million in
AMT. If they had sold their shares by the end of 2000 for thirty-seven
dollars per share, then the sale would have been a disqualifying disposi-
tion, the regular income tax system would have applied, and the Chous
would have paid only $1.5 million of regular income tax. If, however, the
Chous reacquired their shares in a wash sale, then the resulting regular
income tax would have been $2.8 million.
A fourth alternative for the Chous would have been to exercise their
ISOs shortly after their grant date, when their exercise price of five to ten
cents per share was equal to the fair market value of the ISO stock.99 This
would have resulted in zero bargain purchase income, zero AMT, and
zero regular income tax. Along with the reduced tax liability, the incen-
tive aspect of the ISOs would not have decreased, since the Chous would
96 $1.5 million in ordinary income tax ($3.7 million x 39.6%) as compared with
$2 million in AMT ($7 million x 28%). See Weston et al., supra note 13.
97 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
98 See I.R.C. §§ 422(c)(2), 1091(a).
99 An employer must grant ISOs with an exercise price not less than the fair market
value of the stock on the date of grant. Id. § 422(b)(4).
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have to hold their Cisco shares for two years from the date of the grant to
receive favorable ISO tax benefits. Accordingly, the Chous still could
have profitted from the long-term effects of their contributions to Cisco.
If the Chous choose to sell their Cisco shares at any time after the ISO
statutory holding period, any appreciation realized above their in-
significant cost basis would be subject to tax at favorable long-term
capital gains tax rates..
The Chous' fact pattern demonstrates that taxpayers can plan their
transactions to minimize their overall tax costs, including eliminating
AMT. However, tax planning requires an understanding of the tax laws
before consummating transactions. Because the AMT system is so com-
plicated and intricate, most AMT-payers seek professional tax assistance
to prepare their tax returns.1" As demonstrated by the Chous' situation,
tax planning for ISO transactions must occur well before the preparation
of tax returns.
d. Disqualifying Disposition and Exercise in Different Tax Years
If a shareholder exercises her ISO in one year, but then sells her
shares in a disqualifying disposition in a later tax year, the regular tax
and AMT consequences are different, and the employee might be subject
to AMT in the year of the ISO exercise. Under the regular income tax
system, there are no tax consequences in the year of the ISO exercise. 0 1
Under the AMT system, the shareholder must recognize the bargain pur-
chase income as a positive AMT adjustment in the year of exercise and,
therefore, might owe AMT. °2
In the year of the disqualifying disposition of the ISO shares, the
shareholder must recognize the bargain purchase income in her gross
income for regular income tax purposes.103 In addition, any increase in
value of the stock realized after the date of exercise is capital gain.1°4 The
shareholder's capital gain will be long-term if the shareholder held the
shares for more than one year after the date of exercise, and short-term if
the holding period was one year or less.105
0' Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1457 (stating that almost 93% of taxpayers with AMT li-
ability used paid tax preparers).
101 I.R.C. §§ 422, 421(a).
102 Id. §§ 56(b)(3), 55.
103 Id. § 83. Because the option has failed to qualify as an ISO, the Code provides that
the exercise of the option is treated as any other transfer of property for services. Id. Ac-
cordingly, the employee must include in gross income the excess of the fair market value
of the stock as of the date of exercise over the amount paid for the stock, if any, in the
taxable year in which the disqualifying disposition occurred. Id. §§ 83, 421(b); see also
Reicher et al., supra note 7, at A9. If the shares are sold for an amount less than the fair
market value of the shares on the date of exercise, then the amount of bargain purchase
income is limited to any gain realized. I.R.C. § 422(c)(2).
I-I.R.C. § 1001(a).
M Id. § 1222.
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The bargain purchase income that is recognized for regular income
tax purposes in the year of the disqualifying disposition will not be rec-
ognized for AMT purposes. 106 Under the AMT system, the bargain pur-
chase income is recognized in the year of exercise and, therefore, is not
included again in the year of the disqualifying disposition.107 Therefore,
regular taxable income must be reduced by any recognized bargain pur-
chase income to derive AMTI. 1°8 Additionally, under the AMT system,
the basis of the ISO stock sold includes the bargain purchase income rec-
ognized in the year of exercise."° Any gain or loss recognized on the dis-
qualifying disposition for AMT purposes is computed using the higher
AMT stock basis. 1 ' As a result of these reductions to an employee's
regular taxable income to derive AMTI, the employee's regular income
tax should be greater than the employee's AMT."' The employee can use
her AMT credit (that is, any AMT taxes paid in a prior tax year with re-
spect to her ISO exercise) to reduce her regular tax liability to her AMT."'
The employee can carry any AMT credit not used forward to future tax
years indefinitely to reduce her regular tax liability to her AMT."3
The Chous' situation illustrates how tax liability changes when the
exercise and disqualifying sale take place in different years. In 2000, the
Chous will have a positive AMT adjustment equal to $7 million (the bar-
gain purchase income) and a year 2000 AMT bill of $2 million."4 If the
Chous sold their ISO shares of Cisco in an April 2001 disqualifying dis-
position for $18 per share, they would have to recognize ordinary income
of approximately $1.8 million."' For 2001 AMT purposes, the Chous
would be able to reduce their taxable income by $1.8 million to offset the
$1.8 million bargain purchase income included in regular taxable income
from their stock sale." 6 They also would have a $5.2 million capital loss,
consisting of the $7 million AMT basis in Cisco shares, minus the
$1.8 million realized from the sale.
Unfortunately, because the disqualifying disposition would not have
occurred in the same tax year as the exercise, a complete offset of the
"6 See David R. Wenzel, Incentive Stock Options: Impact of Disqualifications, Inter-
action with AMT Credit, 22 TAX ADVISER 435 (1991) (noting that in the year of disquali-
fying disposition the taxpayer will have to make a negative adjustment to taxable income
to compute her AMTI and that the applicable tax forms do not provide for such an adjust-
ment).
107 See H.R. REP. No. 100-795, at 90 (1988).
'01 See Wenzel, supra note 106.
109 I.R.C. § 56(b)(3).
10lId.
I See, e.g., infra notes 114-123 and accompanying text.
'
12 I.R.C. § 53(c).
13 1d.
"4 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
"1 $1,800,000 ($18 x 100,000) less $5,000 (5 cents (exercise price) x 100,000). See
I.R.C. § 422(c)(2).
t6 See Wenzel, supra note 106.
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loss on the stock since the date of exercise against the bargain purchase
income is not available for AMT purposes." 7 As in the regular income
tax system, the $5.2 million capital loss under the AMT system could not
be carried back to prior tax years and would be limited on an annual ba-
sis to recognized capital gains plus $3,000 per tax year.' Therefore, un-
less the Chous had a $5.2 million AMT capital gain, in 2001 they could
use only part of their entire $5.2 million AMT capital loss. Any portion
of the AMT capital loss that remains unused could be carried forward
indefinitely to subsequent tax years to reduce the Chous' AMT capital
gains plus up to $3,000 of their AMTI." 9
As a result of the negative AMT adjustment of $1.8 million and their
AMT capital loss, the Chous' 2001 AMTI would be significantly less
than their regular taxable income. Assuming that the Chous' other items
of taxable income equal their allowable deductions, the Chous' 2001
regular taxable income would be $1.8 million of ordinary income due to
their disqualifying disposition of Cisco stock. The Chous' 2001 regular
income tax liability would be approximately $700,000.120 Assuming that
the Chous have no AMT capital gains or other AMT adjustments, their
2001 AMTI would be zero and their 2001 AMT would also be zero.12 1
The Chous could use $700,000 of their $2 million AMT credit (resulting
from their 2000 AMT) against their regular income tax liability and pay
zero tax in 2001.22 The balance of their AMT credit of $1.3 million
would be carried forward indefinitely to subsequent tax years to reduce
the Chous' regular tax liability to-but not below-their AMT for those
years.123
1l7 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(3).
"' Id. § 1211(b); see Kurt Heinrichson et al., Revisiting ISOs With 24% AMT, 22 TAx
ADVISER 151, 152 (1991).
9 See I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 56(b)(3).
'2 $1.8 million x 39.1% = $700,000. See id. § l(i)(2) (setting forth reduced tax rates
for taxpayers for tax year 2001).
121The Chous would reduce their regular taxable income of $1.8 million by
$1.8 million (bargain purchase income) plus $3,000 capital loss recognized resulting in
AMTI of zero. See id. § 55(b)(2). Tentative minimum tax would also be zero. See id.
§ 55(b)(1). The Chous would have an AMT capital loss carryforward of $5.197 million
($5.2 million realized loss less $3,000 recognized loss), which they could offset against
recognized AMT capital gains plus AMTI up to $3,000 per tax year. See id. §§ 56(b)(3),
1211(b).
22 See id. § 53(c).
2 See id. The Chous' AMT credit carryforward of $1.3 million would be available in
subsequent tax years to reduce their regular tax liability to their AMT. Because the Chous
have a $5.197 million AMT capital loss carryforward from the sale of their Cisco stock(and no regular income tax capital loss carryforward), they would have a negative adjust-
ment to their regular taxable income of at least $3,000 per tax year (plus any offset against
recognized capital gains) to derive their AMTI. See id. § 1211(b). This might result in a
slightly lower annual AMT relative to their regular tax liability ($780, or $3,000 multiplied
by the lowest AMT tax rate, which is 26%). See id. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(I). Therefore, the
Chous might be able to reduce minimally their regular income tax liability to their AMT.
Unless the Chous are able to generate AMT capital gains, they might have to use their
$1.3 million AMT credit carryforward ($1.3 million divided by $780 per year) and
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As one can see from the foregoing scenarios, the tax consequences
of a disqualifying disposition of ISO stock where the exercise and sale
occur in different tax years are complicated. In all cases, the total amount
of income recognized in the year of sale for regular income tax purposes
is greater than or equal to the amount recognized for AMT."2 This occurs
because, for AMT purposes, any bargain purchase income was recog-
nized previously in the year of the ISO exercise. Comparatively, if the
disqualifying disposition occurs in the same tax year as the exercise, the
total amount of income recognized is the same for regular income taxes
and under the AMT.
If the disqualifying disposition and exercise occur in different tax
years, any recognized gain or loss for AMT purposes from the disquali-
fying sale is capital gain or loss.'s Because AMTI might be lower than
regular taxable income, AMT might be lower than regular income tax in
the year of disqualifying sale. Any AMT paid as a result of ISO exercises
can be offset as an AMT credit against regular income tax to reduce it to
the lower AMT. Any excess AMT credit can be carried forward
indefinitely to reduce regular income tax to AMT. Excess AMT credit
and AMT capital loss carryforwards will likely result if AMT capital
losses are significant and limited.
C. The Non-Tax Favored Sister to ISOs: NQSOs
1. What Is an NQSO?
An NQSO (non-qualified stock option) is any compensatory option
that does not satisfy the statutory requirements for characterization as an
ISO and tax-favored treatment.' 26
2. Tax Treatment of an NQSO
a. Grant of an NQSO
Because NQSOs do not satisfy the requirements for tax-favored
treatment, they are subject to the tax provisions applicable to transfers of
property in connection with the performance of services.2 7 Therefore,
$5.197 million capital loss carryforward ($5.197 million divided by $3,000 per year) over
the next 1700 or so tax years (that is, assuming no changes in the Code).
14 If ISOs are exercised when the bargain purchase income is zero, then the total
amount of income recognized in the year of sale for regular income tax purposes and for
AMT will be the same.
t21 The capital gain is long-term if the employee has held her ISO shares for more than
one year after exercise.
126 Options that do not qualify under I.R.C. § 421 are non-qualified stock options
(NQSOs). As a result, NQSOs are subject to tax under I.R.C. § 83.
127 See I.R.C. § 83.
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unless the NQSO has a readily ascertainable fair market value at the time
of the grant,1u the grant of the NQSO is not a recognition event; as with a
grant of an ISO, the grant itself does not constitute a transfer of prop-
erty.
129
b. Exercise of an NQSO
When an employee exercises an NQSO she must recognize as ordi-
nary income the bargain purchase income of the NQSO (that is, the posi-
tive difference between the fair market value of the stock at the date of
exercise and the exercise price paid, if any).'30 This income is subject to
employee withholdings and regular income and payroll taxes.'3' Any
amount recognized as ordinary income is added to the amount paid for
the shares to determine the shareholder's tax basis.X32 The holding period
for the shares acquired begins on the day after the exercise. 33
There are no AMT consequences for the exercise of an NQSO be-
cause all of the economic income has already been included in the em-
ployee's regular income.
c. Disposition of NQSO Stock
When a shareholder sells her shares of stock acquired through the
exercise of NQSOs, the general rules applicable to any sale of a capital
asset dictate the tax consequences.'3 The shareholder recognizes capital
gain or loss equal to the difference between the amount realized from the
sale and the adjusted basis in the shares sold. 35 Capital gain or loss is
long-term or short-term depending upon how long the shareholder held
the shares after her exercise.'36 The capital loss limitations' 37 and the fa-
vorable capital gains tax rates apply.3 8
Employees holding NQSOs often defer exercising as long as possi-
ble because publicly traded stocks have historically increased in value
over time. By waiting, the holder of the NQSO benefits from the stock
appreciation without investing any cash to exercise the option. At the
same time, the holder has avoided the investment risk if the stock price
2 See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7(a) (1978).
129See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a) (as amended in 1985).
I- I.R.C. § 83(a).
'3' See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1 (1978).
132 I.R.C. § 1012.
133 See Rev. Rul. 66-7, 1966-1 C.B. 188.
134 See I.R.C. § 1001.
135 1d. § 1001(a).
136 See id. § 1222.
137 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
13S See I.R.C. § 1(h) (applying a maximum tax rate of 20% on sales of appreciated
stock held for more than one year as a capital asset).
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should decline. However, this deferral of exercise will cause a greater
amount of income to be subject to ordinary income and payroll taxes
upon exercise. If the employee holds the shares for more than one year,
the appreciation after exercise will be subject to tax at favorable long-
term capital gain tax rates. 139 If, however, the holder exercises the NQSOs
as soon as possible, then, provided that the stock value increases over
time, she will minimize the bargain purchase income that is subject to
ordinary income and payroll taxes and maximize any favorable tax treat-
ment of long-term capital gains. Because the amount of income charac-
terized as ordinary income is the excess of the fair market value (as of
the date of exercise) over any amount paid, if the holder exercises as soon
as possible, the fair market value will be at its lowest and any ordinary
income will be a smaller amount than if she had exercised at a later
date. 140 Any subsequent appreciation recognized more than one year after
exercise will be characterized as long-term capital gain, subject to favor-
able tax rates.
III. THE PERVASIVE AMT PROBLEM
Academic and practitioner groups as well as the Internal Revenue
Service and National Taxpayer Advocates have called for repeal or sim-
plification of the AMT. 4' Many people agree that the AMT is too com-
plicated' and that its current and expanding impact is no longer consis-
tent with Congress's purpose in enacting it. There is bipartisan support
139 Id.
140 For example, Employer grants Employee 100 NQSOs with an exercise price of $10
when the fair market value of the stock is $15. Employee exercises her NQSOs one month
after the grant when the fair market value of the stock has increased to $16. Employee
must recognize $600 of ordinary income ($16 fair market value as of the date of exercise
less $10 paid = $6 x 100 shares), subject to ordinary income and payroll taxes. Assume
the stock price increases to $100 during the next eighteen months. If Employee sells her
stock, she will recognize $8,400 of long-term capital gain ($10,000 sales price less $1,600
($1,000 paid + $600 bargain purchase income) adjusted basis in shares), subject to maxi-
mum long-term capital gain tax rate of 20%. Id. § 1(h). If, however, Employee waits to
exercise her NQSOs until the stock price reaches $100 and immediately sells the shares,
she will have to recognize $9,000 as ordinary income ($100 fair market value less $10 paid
= $90 x 100 shares), subject to ordinary income and payroll taxes, and no capital gain
($10,000 sales price less $10,000 ($1,000 paid + $9,000 bargain purchase income) ad-
justed basis in shares).
141 Hamilton, supra note 29 (National Taxpayer Advocate Olson recommends that
Congress repeal the individual AMT); see Annual Report from the Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service on Tax Law Complexity, June 5, 2000; Ryan J. Donmoyer, NAEA
Says AMT Is Biggest Tax Headache of All, 87 TAX NOTES 42 (2000); William G. Gale, Tax
Simplification: Issues and Options, 92 TAX NOTES 1463 (2001); Sheryl Stratton, Oveson
Speaks Out on Tax Code Complexity, 88 TAX NOTES 1177, 1199 (2000) (former National
Taxpayer Advocate W. Val Oveson calls for the repeal of the AMT).
142 Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1457-58 (noting that the AMT adds to "transactional
complexity" and "rule complexity," that taxpayers spent over 29 million hours annually
completing and filing the AMT tax form, and that more than 10% of tax returns with AMT
had errors in the AMT calculation).
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 358 2002
2002] Incentive Stock Options and the Alternative Minimum Tax 359
for AMT reform. 43 Democratic and Republican members of Congress
from more than twenty-five states have cosponsored various bills to sim-
plify, minimize, or even repeal the AMT. 44
In lieu of AMT repeal, which would cost over $600 billion in lost
revenue through 2011,145 critics have made numerous recommendations
for AMT reform. While these amendments do not include elimination of
the ISO exercise AMT adjustment, they nonetheless would minimize
AMT costs for ISO exercisers. 46 They would do this by potentially re-
ducing AMTI through larger exemption amounts and additional deduc-
tions. 47 This Part will discuss a number of the most commonly proposed
AMT amendments: indexing for inflation; eliminating AMT adjustments
for state and local taxes; and eliminating AMT adjustments for personal
and dependency deductions. Academics and practitioners have made ad-
ditional recommendations for reform, including elimination of the AMT
adjustments for the standard deduction and miscellaneous itemized de-
ductions.148 In addition, a strong grassroots movement is developing in
favor of AMT relief for certain ISO exercisers. Notwithstanding, the
three modifications discussed here should vastly simplify the AMT and
significantly reduce the number of AMT taxpayers. Under these propos-
143 Margo Thorning, Policy Briefs: ACCF Research Center Reports on AMT, 67 TAX
NOTES 1425 (1995) (mentioning that AMT reform has bipartisan support and that Presi-
dents Bush and Clinton proposed changes to the AMT).
144 See Active Legislation, at http://www.reformamt.org/legislation.php (last visited
Mar. 26, 2002). On April 4, 2001, Representative Zoe Lofgren sponsored a bill in the
House of Representatives, H.R. 1487, which would repeal the AMT adjustment for ISO
exercises in 2000 and thereafter. See 147 CONG. REc. H1487 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 2001). As
of March 2002, H.R. 1487 had 58 cosponsors (35 Democrats and 23 Republicans repre-
senting 22 states). See Sponsorship of H.R. 1487, at http://www.kls2.com/cgi-
bin/hrspon?bill=hr1487 (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
145 Bennett, supra note 19 (stating estimates from Jerry Tempalski, an economist with
the Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis, that repealing the AMT after enactment
of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA"), Pub. L.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38, would cost $600 billion in lost revenue from 2002 through 2011 and
would cause 35.1 million taxpayers (33% of all taxpayers) to owe AMT in 2010). Esti-
mates of the tax revenue costs before enactment of EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (2001), were $200 billion from 2001 through 2010. See Martin A. Sullivan,
Needed But Not Wanted: $200 billion ofAMTRelief, 88 TAX NOTES 724,726 (2000).
146 Under the current AMT, taxpayers must add back any deductions for state and local
taxes and personal and dependency exemptions to compute their AMTI. I.R.C. §§ 55(b)(2),
56(b)(1)(A)(ii), 56(b)(1)(E). Under the proposed AMT reforms, ISO exercisers would not
have to increase their taxable income by their state and local tax deductions and personal
and dependency exemptions to determine their AMTI. Additionally, ISO exercisers would
compute their AMT by using increased exemption amounts and tax rates indexed for
inflation, which would reduce any AMT. See infra Part III.C. (discussing proposed model
reforms for the AMT).
147 See infra Part II.C.
4 See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1464-65 (describing proposed elimination of the
AMT adjustments for the standard deduction, medical deductions, and miscellaneous
itemized deductions); Hamilton, supra note 29 (noting that Olson recommends that, if
Congress does not repeal the AMT, it should eliminate the standard deduction, deductible
state and local taxes, personal exemptions, and miscellaneous itemized deductions as AMT
adjustments).
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als, the AMT would become more transparent, allowing taxpayers to plan
their transactions in accordance with their economic goals.
A. ReformAMT.com
Shocked and stripped of jobs, investment and retirement value, and
other savings, a large number of former dot.com employees have joined
together in a grassroots organization called ReformAMT. The group's
mission, stated on its Web site, "is to correct an injustice created by the
way in which the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) is inappropriately
and unjustly imposed upon owners of incentive stock options."' 49 Re-
formAMT's mission is: (1) to lobby the government to reform AMT
treatment of employee stock options and to provide retroactive relief to
affected employees; and (2) to educate the public about, and build sup-
port for the reform of, the AMT's treatment of employee stock options.5 0
ReformAMT also serves as a support group for taxpayers affected by the
AMT's treatment of employee stock options. 5'
The popular perception of stock options as perks for the wealthy be-
lies the reality that the AMT has financially ruined many ISO exercisers,
especially those of more moderate means. The ReformAMT Web site
includes stories of members' AMT disasters. For example, consider the
following "Real-Life AMT victim": 52
Norma Mogilefsky, 59, grew up in New York, has a master's
degree in special education, and currently works as a curriculum
developer at a software company. She is a single mom with two
grown children. Throughout her life, she worked hard to raise
her family, pay the bills, and build perfect credit. She hoped to
retire in June.
Last spring, on the advice of a recommended enrolled agent,
Norma took out a second loan against her home for $80,000 so
she could purchase her incentive stock options (ISOs), and then
hold them for a year. This, the agent advised, would put her into
a long-term capital gains tax bracket, which was the prudent
thing to do. The agent never mentioned the potential for an Al-
ternative Minimum Tax (AMT) disaster. He also did not speak
with Norma again until the day that he did her taxes.
1
49 http://www.ReformAMT.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2002). In March 2002, Re-
formAMT had about 1591 members. See ReformAMT Geographic Membership, at
http://www.kls2.com/reformamt/geomembers.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
10 See About ReformAMT, at http://www.reformamt.org/about.php (last visited Feb.
24, 2002).




HeinOnline  -- 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 360 2002
2002] Incentive Stock Options and the Alternative Minimum Tax 361
Her company, meanwhile, sent an e-mail to its employees on
April 2, recommending that those who exercised ISOs in 2000
might be subject to AMT, and should seek professional advice
immediately. It was too late. On April 15, 2001, Norma owed a
tax bill of $303,000, three times her annual salary, on paper
profits she never saw. 53
ReformAMT has rallied a large group of "real-life AMT victims"
and sympathetic allies to educate Congress and the public about its goal
of eliminating AMT liability for the exercise of ISOs in year 2000 and
thereafter. The list of legislators who have supported AMT reforms in-
cludes Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), Tom Harkin (D-Iowa),
Wayne Allard (R-Colo.), John Kerry (D-Mass.), and Barbara Boxer (D-
Cal.), 4 as well as almost fifty members of the House of Representa-
tives.'55 In August 2001, Senator Lieberman and Congressman Richard E.
Neal (D-Mass.) introduced identical bills in the Senate and the House
that potentially would eliminate the AMT for taxpayers who exercised
their ISOs in 2000.156 The bills would provide a one-time fix for taxpay-
ers who were subjected to the AMT due to their 2000 exercise of ISOs
and whose stock experienced significant post-exercise declines in value.
The bills, which have a cost of $1.3 billion over ten years, 57 have been
referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance. 58 More recently, in the October 24, 2001 House of
Representatives mark-up of the "Economic Security and Recovery Act of
2001," the House considered, but rejected, a proposal by Representative
Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.), to eliminate year 2000 and 2001 ISO exer-
cises from normal AMT treatment. 159
153Id.
"' On August 2, 2001, Senator Lieberman sponsored a bill to grant AMT relief to
those who exercised ISOs in 2000. S. 1324, 107th Cong. (2001); 147 CONG. REc. S8704
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001). Senators Harkin, Kerry, Boxer, and Allard became cosponsors
between October and December 2001. See 147 CONG. REc. S10457 (daily ed. Oct. 10,
2001); 147 CONG. REc. S11549 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2001); 147 CONG. REc. S11940 (daily
ed. Nov. 15, 2001); 147 CONG. REc. S12682 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2001).
155 Forty-seven representatives cosponsored a House bill granting AMT relief. See
H.R. 2794, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http:lthomas.loc.gov/bss/dlO7/dlO7bill.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
156 The bills would limit AMT liability for those who exercised ISOs in 2000 by cal-
culating income using the stock value on April 15, 2001 or the amount realized if the stock
was sold, rather than its value on the exercise date. See H.R. 2794, 107th Cong. (2001); S.
1324, 107th Cong. (2001).
157 See Liebennan Bill Would Provide AMT Relieffor Incentive Stock Options, 92 TAx
Nors 1196, 1196-97 (2001) (stating that the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that
the bill would reduce revenues by $1.3 billion over ten years).
"58 See 147 CONG. REc. H5336 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2001); 147 CONG. REc. S8704 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 2001).
159 The Rangel Amendment failed (166-261) on a mostly party-line vote, with forty-
three Democrats voting with Republicans. See 147 CONG. REc. H7279-80 (daily ed. Oct.
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B. The AMT: A Pervasive and Expensive Problem
The AMT has been the subject of concern and controversy since its
enactment as a minimum tax in 1969.160 Many academic and practitioner
groups as well as the Internal Revenue Service and National Taxpayer
Advocates are calling for its repeal or simplification. 6' The Economic
Security and Recovery Act of 2001, which was adopted by the House of
Representatives on October 24, 2001, contained a provision that would
repeal the corporate AMT.162 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
that this provision would cost approximately $24 billion through 2011.163
Critics called the potential repeal of the corporate AMT a windfall for
corporate bankrolls."6
24, 2001). The text of the amendment was as follows:
SEC. 131. ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO
INCENTIVE STOCK OPTIONS EXERCISED DURING 2000.
In the case of an incentive stock option (as defined in section 422 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986) exercised during calendar year 2000 or 2001, the amount
taken into account under section 56(b)(3) of such Code by reason of such exercise
shall not exceed the amount that would have been taken into account if, on the
date of such exercise, the fair market value of the stock acquired pursuant to such
option had been-
(1) its fair market value as of-(A) April 15, 2001, in the case of options exer-
cised during 2000, and (B) December 31, 2001, in the case of options exercised
during 2001, or
(2) if such stock is sold or exchanged on or before the applicable date under
paragraph (1), the amount realized on such sale or exchange.
147 Cong. Rec. H7261 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001). The Rangel Amendment or a variation
thereof might appear in new tax bills. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. S106 (daily ed. Jan. 24,
2002) (submission by Senator Kerry of a variation on the Rangel amendment).
160 Congress enacted the statutory ancestor of the AMT as part of a broad tax reform in
1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
161 See Annual Report from the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service on Tax
Law Complexity, supra note 141; Donmoyer, supra note 141; Gale, supra note 141; Strat-
ton, supra note 141 (noting that former National Taxpayer Advocate W. Val Oveson em-
phasized repeal of the AMT, which he described as "absolutely, asininely stupid"); Sheryl
Stratton, Taxpayer Advocate Addresses 9/11 Relief Offers in Compromise, 93 TAX NOTES
471 (2001).
162 H.R. 3090, 107th Cong., § 103 (2001). The provisions were rejected by the Senate
in late 2001, when the Committee on Finance reported out an amendment in the nature of a
substitute that failed to include any provisions for repeal of the corporate AMT. See 147
CONG. REC. S11678-11696 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2001); Bill Summary and Status for 107th
Congress, H.R. 3090, at http:l/thomas.loc.gov/bssldlO7/dlO7bill.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2002)
'
63 See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF A
MODIFIED CHAIRMAN'S AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 3090, THE "ECONOMIC SECURITY AND RECOVERY ACT OF
2001," JCX-70-01 (Comm. Print 2001).
164 Warren Rojas, Corporate AMT Repeal Strikes a Chord with Democrats, Critics, 93
TAX NOTES 455 (2001) (noting that IBM would receive $1.4 billion, General Motors
$833 million, General Electric $671 million, ChevronTexaco $572 million, Enron
$254 million, American Airlines $184 million, and Comdisco $144 million).
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While President George W. Bush "has incessantly prodded the Sen-
ate to pass the stimulus measure,' ' 65 the Senate rejected the bill, along
with its proposed revisions to the AMT, in late 2001.166 Debate on an
economic stimulus package continued in early 2002, and, on March 9,
2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the Job Creation and
Worker Assistance Act of 2002.167 The new law does not make any
changes to the existing individual AMT and makes only one temporary
change to the corporate AMT.1
61
Thus, the individual and corporate AMT continues to exist today. If
Congress does not amend the AMT, it will impact an increasing number
of taxpayers at an aggressive pace. The Joint Committee on Taxation es-
timates that, under current law, by 2010 thirty-five million taxpayers (ap-
proximately 33% of all individual taxpayers) will face the AMT.16 9 There
is overwhelming consensus that the AMT is no longer operating as Con-
gress intended and that something must be done. 70 However, the notion
of repealing the individual AMT has paralyzed members of Congress
because the cost of eliminating the individual AMT is estimated at more
than $600 billion through 2011.171 Additionally, some members of Con-
'65 Janet Hook, Stimulus Bill on Way to Its Death, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al.
16On November 13, 2001, the Committee on Finance introduced amended bill
SA2125 (the Economic Recovery and Assistance for American Workers Act of 2001 pro-
posed by Senator Max Baucus (D-Mont.)), which effectively replaced the "Economic Se-
curity and Recovery Act of 2001." See 147 CONG. REc. S11678-11696 (daily ed. Nov. 13,
2001). On November 14, 2001, the Senate rejected the Economic Recovery and Assistance
for American Workers Act of 2001. See 147 CONG. Rnc. S11,783 (daily ed. Nov. 14,
2001).
I67 Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21.
168 The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, among other things, provides
for temporary relief from corporate net operating loss limitation under the AMT. 148
CONG. REc. S1661 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2002). The Act also provides for special accelerated
depreciation for certain assets acquired after September 10, 2001 and before September 11,
2004. Id. at S1660. To ensure that qualifying taxpayers will enjoy this tax benefit, the 2002
Act amends the AMT to provide that this deduction is allowable under the AMT system.
Id.; see also Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act, § 101.
,
69 See Bennett, supra note 19. Estimates of the tax revenue costs before enactment of
EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001), were $200 billion through 2010. See
Gale, supra note 141, at 1469 (citing J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., ESTIMATED
REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2002 BUDGET PROPOSAL (2001));
see also Warren Rojas, JCT Estimates Bush Tax Cut Would Double AMT Taxpayers, 89
TAX NOTES 171 (2001).
170 See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1455-56 (stating that "[p]erhaps no rules in the In-
ternal Revenue Code are so regularly featured on tax simplification hit lists as the individ-
ual and corporate alternative minimum taxes" and supporting his comment with reports
calling for simplification from the ABA Tax Section, AICPA, Tax Executives Institute,
National Association of Enrolled Agents, IRS, and a National Taxpayer Advocate); see
also Hamilton, supra note 29; Stewart S. Karlinsky, American Taxation Association Rec-
ommends Modifications to AMT, 71 TAX NOTES 1167 (1996) (suggesting five changes to
the AMT).
171 See Bennett, supra note 19. One estimate placed the cost of repealing the AMT
prior to the enactment of the EGTRRA at $162 billion. Warren Rojas, Taxpayers Burned by
AMT Look for Support, 92 TAX NOTES 153, 154 (2001); see also Economic Analysis-Like
Gasoline on a Fire, House Bill Fuels AMT Problems, in Readings in Federal Tax Policy,
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gress are concerned that an absolute repeal of the AMT, which Congress
originally enacted to ensure that high economic income taxpayers paid at
least some income taxes, might not be good tax policy. 172
Considering the broad impact the AMT is fast imposing on millions
of taxpayers, AMT reform (although probably not repeal) is very likely
in the near future.173 However, whether or not the AMT adjustment for an
exercise of ISOs will be eliminated or even modified, as proposed in the
ReformAMT-supported bills currently under consideration by congres-
sional committees, is not clear. There are twenty-eight AMT preferences
and adjustments. Three of these twenty-eight items account for over 90%
(in dollar terms) of total AMT preferences: state and local tax deductions
(54%), personal and dependency exemption deductions (23%), and mis-
cellaneous itemized deductions above the 2% floor (20%). 74 The ISO
adjustment accounted for 5% of all AMT preferences and adjustments in
2000 ($1.9 billion of adjustments) and is estimated to account for only
1% of the total projected preferences and adjustments in 2010
($4.5 billion).175 As compared to the AMT adjustments for state and local
tax deductions, personal and dependency exemption deductions, and mis-
cellaneous itemized deductions, the ISO adjustment does not and is not
projected to represent a significant component of aggregate AMT ad-
justments.
C. Model Reforms
1. Index for Inflation
The primary reason for the increase in the number of taxpayers sub-
ject to AMT is that the AMT system fails to index for inflation.' 76 The
available at www.tax.org/federal/Federal Readings/freadmain.htm (last visited Oct. 27,
2001) (citing cost estimates for eliminating the AMT of $242 billion under the Bush pro-
posal or $292 billion under H.R. 3; a modified version of the two plans was signed into law
as the EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, on June 7, 2001).
172 These members seek to avoid the loss of taxpayer confidence that would result if
the system did not assess any tax on high-income individuals or entities. See J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 99th Cong., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, JCS-
10-87, at 432-33 (1987). "The ability of high-income taxpayers to pay little or no tax un-
dermines respect for the entire tax system and, thus, for the incentive provisions them-
selves. In addition, even aside from public perceptions, Congress decided that it is inher-
ently unfair for high-income taxpayers to pay little or no tax due to their ability to utilize
tax preferences." Id.; see also Heidi Glenn et al., Simplification and AMT. Costly and
Anything But Simple, 22 INSUR. TAX REV. 23, 24 (2002) (suggesting that while most mem-
bers of Congress would support the idea of AMT repeal, they have consistently decided
against doing anything because AMT serves a purpose in the tax system and to repeal it
without otherwise dealing with these issues would revive them).
M See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1456.
174 ROBERT REBELEIN & JERRY TEMPALSKI, WHO PAYS THE INDIVIDUAL AMT?, OFFICE
OF TAX ANALYSIS PAPER 87 (2000).
171 Id. at Table 5.
176 Id.
[Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 364 2002
2002] Incentive Stock Options and the Alternative Minimum Tax 365
regular income tax system indexes many deductions, 177 deduction limits,
and tax rate schedules 78 for inflation. Indexing is good policy because it
prevents tax costs from increasing solely because inflated income out-
paces fixed deductions and rates. Surprisingly, the AMT does not have an
analogous inflation adjustment system, even though Congress intended
that the two systems operate in a parallel manner. Over the years taxpay-
ers have become increasingly likely to be subject to the AMT, not be-
cause of their artful manipulation of deductions and exclusions in the
Code, but because their tentative minimum tax has not been adjusted for
bracket creep while their regular tax has. 179
Indexing the exemption amounts, the phase-out thresholds, and the
tax rate brackets for inflation from 1986 through 2000 would have re-
duced the number of tax returns subject to AMT in 2000 from 1.3 million
to 300,000.80 For 2010, the projected effect would reduce the number of
returns subject to AMT from 17 million to 300,000.81 Because the AMT
rate brackets would be adjusted and a larger exemption amount would be
allowed under an indexed AMT system, many ISO exercisers no longer
would be subject to AMT if the law were amended to include inflation
indexing. 182
Unfortunately, the cost of indexing the exemption amount, the
phase-out thresholds, and the tax rate brackets to 2001 levels is a stag-
gering $370 billion from 2002 through 2011.'8 This cost may be worth-
while, however, to prevent the number of taxpayers subject to AMT from
increasing until the AMT effectively replaces the regular income tax
system."84 By 2010, one out of three taxpayers, or more than 35 million
177 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 63(c)(4) (indexing the standard deduction amounts) and
151(d)(4) (indexing personal and dependency exemption amounts).
7Id. § 1(f).
179 See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1456 (stating that from 1996 to 1998, the number of
AMT taxpayers rose from 480,000 to 828,000, which is a 72.5% increase). Bracket creep
occurs when inflation lifts a person's taxable income into a higher tax bracket or increases
income relative to allowable deductions. The net result is stagnant purchasing power with
an increase in income tax payable.
180 REBELEIN & TtmPALsKi, supra note 174, at Table 1.
8'Id. Note that this information does not include the AMT impact of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, which is expected to increase the num-
ber of AMT taxpayers in 2010 to 35 million. See Bennett, supra note 19 (citing Tempal-
ski's estimate that indexing the AMT at 2001 levels would reduce the number of AMT
payers by about 10 million in 2005 and 20 million in 2009).
8 If Congress indexes the AMT exemption, phase-out levels, and the tentative mini-
mum tax calculation for inflation, then the exemption amount will be approximately
$70,000 (increased from $45,000), and the tentative minimum tax will be 26% on the first
$208,000 (increased from $175,000) of taxable excess and 28% on any amount of excess
over $208,000 (increased from $175,000). See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1463.
183 See Bennett, supra note 19 (citing Tempalski's estimate). Prior to the enactment of
the EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001), the estimated cost for indexing the
AMT for inflation to 2000 levels was $83.3 billion from 2001 through 2010. See Rebelein
& Tempalski, supra note 174, at Table 2.
1 4See Graetz, supra note 39.
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taxpayers, will owe AMT.'85 However, because the application of the AMT
and its tax calculations are so complicated, most taxpayers are not aware
that they may be subject to AMT or even that the AMT system exists.186
This kind of stealth tax policy lacks transparency and destroys taxpayer
confidence in the federal income tax system. Taxpayers are not likely to
tolerate this type of policy, and, given the significant number and per-
centage of impacted taxpayers, their political outcry could eventually
dwarf ReformAMT's grassroots efforts.1 17
2. Eliminate AMT Adjustments for State and Local Tax Deductions
Taxpayers residing in high tax states such as California and New
York might find themselves subject to AMT if they take large deductions
for their state tax payments. The 2000 AMT adjustment for state and lo-
cal itemized deductions was by far the largest adjustment item, account-
ing for 54% of all adjustments. 88 By 2010, as the AMT adjustment for
personal and dependency exemptions increases at a relatively faster rate,
the state and local tax deductions are projected to decrease, but still ac-
count for 44% of all AMT adjustments.'89 It is unreasonable that the cur-
rent AMT regime effectively penalizes individuals for paying their state
and local taxes. These payments actually reduce taxpayers' economic
income. Moreover, they are legally enforceable taxpayer obligations, not
artful or abusive manipulations of the Code.
Arguments can be made for and against state and local tax deducti-
bility under any tax system.' 90 Because taxes paid by an individual some-
times correlate with government-provided goods and services, and be-
cause these benefits are excluded from gross income, some argue that
disallowing state and local tax deductions is a fair substitute for taxing
185 See Bennett, supra note 19.
186 Hamilton, supra note 29 (noting National Taxpayer Advocate Olson's comments
that the AMT is so complicated, many taxpayers are not aware that they may be subject to
it).
187 ReformAMT and its 1591 members have done a commendable job of marshalling
support from Congress. See http://www.ReformAMT.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2002); Re-
formAMT Geographic Membership, at http://www.kls2.com/reformamt/geomembers.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002). With 35 million more voices, the campaign for AMT reform
will be even stronger.
188 REBELEIN & TEMPALSKI, supra note 174, at Table 5.
189 Id. at 15 (determining that decline in percentage of state and local tax deductions
will occur because taxpayers with several personal and dependency exemptions will com-
prise an increasing share of AMT taxpayers).
'9o See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1465 (stating that the arguments against deductibility
of state and local taxes have the upper hand in current academic debate and citing Louis
Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Fed-
eral Income Tax System, 82 VA. L. REv. 413 (1996), opposing deductibility, and Brookes
D. Billman & NoEl B. Cunningham, Nonbusiness State and Local Taxes: The Case for
Deductibility, 28 TAX NOTES 1107 (1985), favoring deductibility).
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consumption of state or local government-provided goods and services.1 91
This argument might provide support for a change in the tax law to
eliminate deductions for state and local taxes and the exclusion from tax-
able income of these goods and services for taxpayers in low or zero tax
states. However, the current denial of state and local tax deductions under
the AMT system causes taxpayers (including ISO exercisers) in high tax
states to lose this material deduction, while not requiring taxpayers in
low or zero tax states to include government-provided goods and services
in their incomes. If members of Congress want to eliminate the deduction
for state and local taxes and the exclusion of government-provided goods
and services in low or zero tax states, the legislation should be straight-
forward and readily understandable by constituents. The complexity and
lack of inflationary indexing in the AMT should not be used to obscure
its disallowance of increasing state and local tax deductions for taxpayers
in high tax states. Legislation that makes sweeping and significant
changes should not be drafted to hide its purpose. 92
It is particularly arbitrary that ISO exercisers lose their state and lo-
cal tax deductions merely because they realize economic income that
makes them liable for AMT. If the state and local tax deduction is al-
lowed under the AMT, fewer ISO exercisers will be subject to the AMT.
To the extent that some ISO exercisers would remain subject to the AMT
after deducting state and local tax payments, these individuals would re-
ceive fairer tax treatment because their AMT would result from their bar-
gain purchase income in excess of any allowable exemption amount and
not from the loss of their state and local tax deductions.
3. Eliminate AMT Adjustments for Personal and
Dependency Deductions
Personal and dependency exemption deductions are allowed in the
regular income tax system for taxpayers with adjusted gross income lev-
els below certain threshold amounts. 93 These exemptions are not tax
shelters or artful or abusive manipulations of the Code; rather, they are
accepted tools for decreasing the tax liability of middle- and low-income
taxpayers. Because these deductions are phased out at higher levels of
income under the regular tax system,'94 high-income taxpayers generally
191 See Kaplow, supra note 190; see, e.g., I.R.C. § 265 (setting forth the rules for the
denial of deduction for expenses and interest related to tax-exempt income).
192 See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1457-58 (suggesting that "anyone who values trans-
parency in the tax system-whether to improve monitoring by voters or to assist policy-
makers in understanding what they are actually doing-has reason to consider the AMT
highly objectionable").
I- I.R.C. § 151(d)(3).
14Note, however, that under the EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 102, 115 Stat. 38
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 151 (2001)), the phase-out of the personal and dependency ex-
emptions is itself phased out over time beginning in 2006 through 2009. However, in 2010
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do not benefit from personal and dependency exemptions. Thus, the
regular income tax system already monitors the deductibility of personal
and dependency exemptions, only allowing such deductions for middle-
and low-income taxpayers. Therefore, the adjustment in the AMT system
is redundant for high-income taxpayers, since they would not even re-
ceive the deductions under the regular income tax system.' 95 To the extent
that the AMT system is intended to target such high-paying taxpayers,
adjustments for personal and dependency deductions are unnecessary
because they currently benefit only middle- and low-income taxpayers.
IV. THE AMT ADJUSTMENT FOR ISO BARGAIN PURCHASE INCOME Is
APPROPRIATE BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS ECONOMIC INCOME OTHERWISE
EXCLUDED FROM TAXABLE INCOME
Congress intended that the AMT adjustment for the bargain purchase
income from the exercise of ISOs limit the tax benefits ISO exercisers
derive under the Code.' 96 The bargain purchase income realized as a re-
sult of the ISO exercise is not included in regular taxable income, be-
cause the Code specifically excludes it.' 97 An ISO exercise at a price be-
low the fair market value of the stock, however, generates economic in-
come for the employee. The employee has benefited from a bargain stock
purchase, and, but for the ISO income exclusion provisions, she would
otherwise have to recognize and include this economic income in her
gross income.' 98
Congress enacted a number of ISO-specific provisions to minimize
the tax benefits of the ISO exclusion. Most importantly, the bargain pur-
chase income realized by an employee in her ISO exercise is an AMT
adjustment 99 If the bargain purchase income plus the taxpayer's other
AMT adjustments exceeds the AMT exemption amount,200 and if the tax-
payer's "tentative minimum tax"20' exceeds her regular income tax (with
a top marginal tax rate of 38.6% in 2002),02 she will owe AMT.23 Addi-
and thereafter, the phase-out of personal and dependency exemptions is scheduled to re-
turn. Id.
'95 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(E).
'96 See I.R.C. §§ 56, 421.
191 Id. § 421(a)(1).
198 Id. § 83(e)(1).
'99 See id. § 56(b)(3).
200 After inflation adjustments, this amount would be approximately $60,000-$70,000
for married taxpayers filing jointly or surviving spouses. See Shaviro, supra note 30, at
1463.
201 A taxpayer computes her tentative minimum tax by determining her AMTI in ex-
cess of any allowable exemption amount. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(ii). This "taxable excess" is
subject to tax at 26% for the first $175,000, plus 28% on any excess above $175,000. Id.
§ 55(b)(1)(A)(i). If indexed for inflation, the tax would be 26% on the first $208,000, plus
28% on any excess above $208,000. See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1463.
m Rev. Proc. 2001-59, § 3, 2001-52 I.R.B. 623 (setting forth the 2002 tax rate tables
for individual taxpayers under I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) with ordinary income tax rates ranging
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tionally, Congress has specifically limited the amount of ISO grants exer-
cisable for the first time by any employee in any tax year to $100,000 of
stock, valued as of the date of the grant, in order to limit the amount of
annual ISO tax benefits.' Congress has further limited the potential ISO
tax benefits by requiring employers to grant ISOs at an exercise price no
less than the fair market value of the stock price.' 5 Therefore, on the date
an employee receives an ISO from her employer, the bargain purchase
income is zero.' Furthermore, employers may not grant ISOs to indi-
viduals with 10% or more of the corporate voting power.2 7 Accordingly,
Congress has limited ISO benefits to less than 10% owners and, effec-
tively, limited the aggregate number of ISO grants to any one em-
ployee.05 These provisions ensure that excessive ISO grants will not
qualify for favorable ISO tax treatment. Moreover, even if ISO grants
meet the annual and aggregate ownership limitations, if an employee's
bargain purchase income recognized in any one year is significant, she
may have to pay AMT.2
There are several ways for ISO exercisers to minimize or even avoid
AMT. An ISO exerciser will be subject to AMT only if her bargain pur-
chase income plus her other AMT adjustments exceeds her exemption
amount, and if her "tentative minimum tax" exceeds her regular income
tax.210 When an employee receives an ISO grant, she has zero bargain
purchase income (that is, her ISO exercise price is no less than the fair
market value of the stock). 211 If an employee exercises her ISOs soon af-
ter the date of grant, she will have little or no bargain purchase income
and, therefore, will not owe AMT. Moreover, annual and aggregate ISO
from 10% to 38.6%).
203 AMT is the excess of a taxpayer's tentative minimum tax over her regular tax for
the taxable year. I.R.C. § 55(a).
' Id. § 422(d)(1).
- Id. § 422(b)(4).
206 Bargain purchase income is the excess of the fair market value of stock over its ex-
ercise price. If exercise price is equal to fair market value, bargain purchase income is
zero.
- I.R.C. § 422(b)(6). In any such case, I.R.C. § 422(c)(5) changes the total dis-
qualification to a requirement that ISOs granted to any 10% or greater owner (measured by
corporate voting power) must have an exercise price at least equal to 110% of the fair mar-
ket value of the stock on the date of grant and a maximum term of five years.
2m ISO grants are limited on an annual basis to $100,000 of stock value and must be
exercised within ten years of the grant. Id. § 422(d), (b)(3). Thus, an employee-owner re-
ceiving the maximum annual ISO grants could attain ownership of 10% or more of the
corporate voting power and, thereafter, be limited in her ISO tax benefits. See id. § 422
(b)(6), (c)(5).
2 See id. §§ 56(b)(3), 55.
210 If Congress indexes the AMT exemption, phase-out levels, and the tentative mini-
mum tax calculation for inflation, then the exemption amount will be approximately
$70,000, and the tentative minimum tax will be 26% on the first $208,000 of taxable ex-
cess and 28% on any amount of excess over $208,000. See Shaviro, supra note 30, at 1463.
211 I.R.C. § 422(b)(4).
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grants to each employee are also limited.2 ' Thus, ISO stock value would
have to increase significantly from the date of grant to the date of exer-
cise to generate enough bargain purchase income to cause an ISO exer-
ciser to owe AMT if she exercises her ISOs soon after the grant.2 '
Effective planning also may eliminate AMT liability. Employees ex-
ercising their ISOs immediately after the date of grant will have zero
bargain purchase income and, therefore, will not owe AMT or regular
income tax on the exercise.2 1 4 The employee will defer recognition of any
subsequent appreciation on her ISO shares until she sells them.2 15 Any
gain recognized after the end of the statutory holding period will be sub-
ject to tax at favorable long-term capital gain tax rates.2 1 6 Employees
holding ISOs with a significant amount of built-in bargain purchase in-
come can manage their ISO exercises over time to minimize or even
eliminate their AMT. ISOs can usually be exercised over a period of time
of up to ten years from the date of grant.2 1 7 Therefore, a holder can plan
to exercise her ISOs in a manner that minimizes her overall tax liability.
Congress enacted favorable tax treatment for ISOs but intentionally
limited the amount and scope of these tax benefits. Employers and em-
ployees can structure their ISOs to receive the maximum amount of tax
benefits provided under the Code. Elimination of the ISO adjustment un-
der the AMT is inconsistent with congressional intent to limit these
benefits and to tax economic income.
V. THE AMT ADJUSTMENT FOR THE BARGAIN PURCHASE INCOME OF AN
ISO EXERCISE PUTS ISOs ON PAR WITH NQSOs, OTHER EMPLOYEE
BARGAIN PURCHASES, AND INVESTMENTS
Employees who receive any amount of compensation, NQSO exer-
cisers, and employees benefiting from any bargain purchase from their
employers must recognize these benefits, subject to ordinary income tax
rates (up to 38.6% in 2002) .2 11 Correspondingly, if an employee realizes a
significant amount of bargain purchase income upon exercise of her
212 The fair market value of shares (as of the date of grant) with respect to which all
ISOs held by an employee may first become exercisable in any calendar year may not ex-
ceed $100,000. See id. § 422(d). Employers may not grant ISOs to individuals with 10% or
more of the corporate voting power. Id. § 422(b)(6), (c)(5).
213 Without considering any phase-out of the exemption amount, the bargain purchase
income plus other AMT adjustments would have to exceed $70,000 on $100,000 of initial
stock value. Therefore, in order to owe AMT, an employee exercising the maximum annual
stock value grant of $100,000 during the first possible tax year would have to receive stock
with a fair market value in excess of $170,000, with an exercise price of $100,000 (a 70%
return on her investment).
214 See I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(3), 55, 83.215 See id. § 1001.216 See id. §§ 422(a)(1), 1222, 1(h).
217 Id. § 422(b)(3).
2'18 See id. §§ l(i), 61, 83; Rev. Proc. 2001-52, 2001-59 I.R.B. 623.
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ISOs, she will have to pay AMT at a current tax rate of up to 28%.219 If
qualifying ISO stock later declines in value, the employee cannot offset
the decline against her previously recognized income, but instead must
recognize her capital loss subject to any capital loss limitations. 20 Simi-
larly, if stock acquired by NQSOs or any other bargain-purchased asset
declines in value, an employee cannot reduce previously recognized in-
come, but must likewise recognize her capital loss subject to any capital
loss limitations." Thus, ISO exercisers with significant amounts of bar-
gain purchase income must pay AMT and will receive tax treatment on
par with other employee investors.m
Employees who use their compensation to make independent in-
vestments in the stock market must pay ordinary income and payroll
taxes on that compensation. If the stock investments subsequently decline
in value, the only way that those employees could realize a tax benefit
would be by selling the stock and recognizing a capital loss, which then
could be offset first against recognized capital gains and then against or-
dinary income up to $3,000 per tax year.?23
Likewise, employees exercising NQSOs pay ordinary income and
payroll taxes on the bargain purchase income realized from their exer-
cises. If the stock they acquire subsequently declines in value, they have
no ability to offset previously recognized ordinary income subject to tax
at ordinary income tax rates. Once again, these employees' only tax
benefit from a sale of the depreciated stock is to recognize a capital
loss . 4
Similarly, employees who benefit from any bargain purchase of
property from their employers (for example, any bargain purchase of a
car, boat, furniture, or other property) will recognize ordinary income
219 See I.R.C. §§ 55, 56(b)(3).
220See id. § 1211(b).
21Id.
See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
PROVISIONs RELATING TO EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS 2 (Comm. Print 2000) (stating that
ISO transactions under the AMT are treated the same as NQSO transactions). Similarly, if
the gain on a sale of qualified small business stock is significant, an AMT adjustment ef-
fectively eliminates the tax preference for qualified small business stock gains and taxes
such gains like any other long-term capital gain. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(7). Currently, a share-
holder realizing a gain on the sale of qualified small business stock may exclude 50% of
such gain from income. Id. § 1202(a). The 50% recognized gain is subject to tax at a 28%
long-term capital gain tax rate. Id. § 1(h)(5)(A)(ii). Therefore, the effective tax rate on the
gain recognized is 14%. Under the AMT, 21% (42% of the 50% excluded gain) must be
added back to taxable income. See id. § 57(a)(7). As a result, 71% of the gain on qualified
small business stock is included in AMTI and subject to tax at 28%; therefore, the effective
tax rate for qualified small business stock gains is approximately 20% (71% of the gain x
28% tax rate), which is the maximum tax rate for long-term capital gains. Id. § 1(h)(1)(C).
In this way, the AMT adjustment eliminates the preferential tax treatment for qualified
small business stock and puts such gains on par with other long-term capital gains.
22 3See I.R.C. § 1211(b).
M4Id.
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subject to income and payroll taxes.' z They also risk depreciation of
their purchased assets to levels below the market value on the date of
purchase. If the purchased assets decline in value, the employee's only
potential for recognizing any tax benefit on realized economic losses and
sale of such assets would be through limited capital loss tax benefits."z
Thus, the AMT adjustment for ISO exercisers merely puts such em-
ployees in the same tax position as employee investors, NQSO exercis-
ers, and other employee bargain purchasers described above. Even if ISO
stock declines in value after the date of exercise, an employee's tax posi-
tion is no worse than any other employee investor subject to capital loss
limitations. Eliminating the AMT adjustment for ISO exercisers would
anomolously allow them to pay lower long-term capital gain tax rates on
an unlimited amount of bargain purchase income and to defer taxes until
they sell their ISO stock.
VI. CONCLUSION
People want just taxes, more than they want lower taxes. They
want to know that every man is paying his proportionate share
according to his wealth.
-Will Rogers227
The AMT system is broken and must be fixed. Given the current
projected budget deficits, Congress might not be in a position to incur the
enormous costs of repealing the individual AMT. Nonetheless, Congress
will have to make significant amendments to the AMT system to get it
back on track to achieve its intended goals. As more and more taxpayers
become liable for AMT, resistance will become an increasingly serious
problem for the tax system.
Congress should amend the individual AMT to focus its impact on
high economic income taxpayers and to simplify its rules and influences
on business transactions. ReformAMT is lobbying for elimination of the
AMT adjustment for ISO exercises. The ISO AMT adjustment, however,
is the type of adjustment Congress intended: a tax on significant eco-
nomic income that would otherwise escape current taxation. However,
other reforms would increase AMT transparency and decrease the num-
ber of middle- and low-income taxpayers subject to AMT while meeting
225 This does not include allowable employee discounts. See id. § 132(c) (allowing
qualified discounts to be excluded from an employee's gross income).
226 See id. §§ 1211(b) (limiting recognized capital losses to recognized capital gains
plus $3,000), 165(c) (disallowing any loss from the sale of a personal use asset, such as a
car or personal residence).
227 Jeffrey L. Yablon (compiler and arranger), As Certain as Death-Quotations About
Taxes (Expanded 1997 Edition), 77 TAx NOTES 1485, 1497 (1997).
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the original intent of the AMT system. If Congress indexes for inflation
the AMT exemptions, phase-out thresholds, and tax rate brackets, many
middle- and low-income taxpayers will no longer be subject to the AMT.
Only taxpayers who have realized a significant amount of economic in-
come not subject to regular income taxes should pay AMT. By also
eliminating adjustments for state and local tax deductions and personal
and dependency exemption deductions, Congress can ensure that taxpay-
ers are not arbitrarily subjected to AMT liability merely because they
happen to live in a high-tax state or have a large family.
Simplification of the AMT will increase the system's legitimacy by
improving taxpayer understanding of the application of the AMT and its
tax calculations. Once taxpayers understand these rules, they can manage
their transactions to minimize their overall tax costs, including reducing
any AMT.' Most vitally, fewer taxpayers should find themselves in the
financially devastating position of recent ISO exercisers. In the future, we
likely will see AMT reform that will save many ISO exercisers from
AMT liability, but it will probably be packaged in AMT amendments that
do not modify the AMT adjustment for the bargain purchase income
from an ISO exercise. 229
m Taxpayers legitimately may structure their ISO transactions so as to minimize their
tax:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging
one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor;
and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law de-
mands: taxes are enforced extractions, not voluntary contributions. To demand
more in the name of morals is mere cant.
Comm'r v. Newman, 159 F2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 859 (1947).
m See Amy Hamilton, Congress Hands Thorny AMT Issue to Taxpayer Advocate, 93
TAX NOTES 755, 755 (2001) (noting that congressional staff for the taxwriting committees
has consistently told National Taxpayer Advocate that there will be no legislative fix for
ISO exercisers).
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